Using a game theoretical perspective, Adam Przeworski has stated that “democracies last when they evoke spontaneous compliance from all the major political forces.” The two main sets of players, the public and their agents (political elites, political entrepreneurs, and elected officials), are assumed to be conscious that their actions affect each other and that equilibrium is reached based on the appropriate anticipation of the other players’ actions. Political psychology tells us that in the real world, information is imperfect and incomplete, and conscious activity is limited. Using what we know about the structure of affect, I view public actions as a product of endogenous beliefs and the emotional reaction to exogenous forces. Beliefs entail long-term sentiments about liberalization, capitalism, global or regional governance, and development in general. Exogenous reactions largely reflect short-term evaluations of economic and political performance. An interactive composite offers a more accurate view of public action and reaction. This empirical work will focus on Central and Eastern Europe. The key question is whether the study of affect can contribute to game theoretic analyses of politics.
|Keywords:||Game Theory, Democratic Equilibrium, Political Psychology|
Professor, Political Science, University of Illinois, Springfield, IL, USA
There are currently no reviews of this product.Write a Review